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Recent Developments in the Law of Joint and Several
Liability and the Impact of Plaintiff's Employer's Fault
Edward J. Kionka*
I. JOINT AND SEVERAL ("IN SOLIDO") LIABILITY-AN OVERVIEW
Until recently, joint and several liability was a very simple concept,
nationally and in Louisiana. The issue arises when a plaintiff can join (or sue
successively) multiple tortfeasors, all of whom are legally liable to the plaintiff
for an indivisible harm.'
Example: Mutt is filling his gasoline tank at a service station, and he
negligently allows a large quantity of gasoline to overflow onto the
ground, creating a large puddle. Mutt drives off. Jeff, another
customer, walking to his car, negligently flicks a cigarette into the
gasoline puddle, causing it to explode, injuring Peter, a service station
employee.
Peter can join Mutt and Jeff in a single lawsuit2 and obtain judgment against
both. Assume Peter is awarded $100,000. Under the traditional version of
joint and several liability, Peter can collect the $100,000 from either Mutt or Jeff
or both in any combination he wants, since they are jointly and severally liable.4
Note that in this hypothetical, Mutt and Jeff are complete strangers; their
negligence was independent and successive in time. But they are still "joint"
tortfeasors, because their negligence combined to produce a single, indivisible
harm to Peter.5
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1. This analysis excludes liability for intentional torts (assault, battery, false imprisonment, etc.)
and liability for acts in concert, in the nature of a civil conspiracy. In these situations, different rules
-of joint and several liability and contribution often apply. See. e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2324(A). See
also Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Article 2324: The Discombobulating State of Solidarity in Post Tort
Reform Louisiana, 54 La. L. Rev. 551 (1994).
2. Ordinarily, a plaintiff is not required to sue all joint tortfeasors in a single action. Huguet v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 196 La. 771, 774, 200 So. 141, 142 (1941); Thomas v. Doe, 542 So.
2d 740, 741 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989). However, under modern rules of comparative fault and
modified solidary liability, such joinder has become a practical necessity. See Martha Chamallas,
Comparative Fault and Multiple Party Litigation in Louisiana: A Sampling of the Problems, 40 La.
L. Rev. 373, 388-89 (1980).
3. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 47 (5th ed. 1984).
4. Id.
5. Solidary liability also extends to the liability of a tortfeasor for subsequent negligence in
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During the past two decades, tort law in the United States has moved rapidly
from contributory negligence as a complete bar to some form of comparative
fault, where plaintiff's negligence only reduces his damages, 6 and from a rule
of no contribution among joint tortfeasors to either pro rata (equal) or pro tanto
(comparative) contribution.7
With these changes, it has been argued that pure joint and several liability
is no longer just-a plaintiff who can recover even though he is at fault should
have to share some of the risks with which negligent defendants have been
saddled on the theory that they were "wrongdoers" entitled to less protection
under the law.
The primary function of joint and several liability is to place the risk of
uncollectibility on the defendants. If any defendant found liable to the plaintiff
is uninsured or underinsured and otherwise unable to pay a share of the
judgment, the plaintiff can collect his judgment from any combination of the
other liable defendants, leaving each to attempt to recoup in a contribution claim
the amount paid in excess of his share.' Several liability (each defendant is
liable to the plaintiff only for its proportional share of the plaintiff's judgment)
shifts the risk of uncollectibility to the plaintiff.
Example: Assume that in the preceding hypothetical, the jury assesses
fault as follows: Mutt 50%; Jeff 50%; verdict for $100,000. Jeff is
uninsured and insolvent. If pure several liability is applied, Peter can
only collect $50,000 from Mutt, leaving him unable to collect the
remaining $50,000.
Secondarily, several liability may also shift to the plaintiff the cost of the
proportional share of tortfeasors that the plaintiff cannot sue, or with whom the
plaintiff may have settled. This depends on the form of several liability adopted.
Example: Assume that in the preceding hypothetical, the state was also
negligent because it failed to require gas station owners to install
automatic fuel shutoff devices. However, the state is immune from
negligence liability for failing to enforce the law. Assume further that
treatment, and hence the original tortfeasor and the negligent physician may be treated the same as
joint tonfeasors for purposes of this analysis. Lambert v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 629
So. 2d 328, 329 (La. 1993).
6. Only four states-Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia-still adhere to the rule
that a plaintiff's contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery. In most comparative
negligence jurisdictions, the law of comparative negligence is now codified. See generally Keeton
et al., supra note 3, § 67.
7. Keeton et al., supra note 3, § 50; M. Kevin Queenan, Comment, Civil Code Article 2324:
A Broken Path to Limited Solidary Liability, 49 La. L. Rev. 1351, 1364-65 (1989).
8. An interesting issue, beyond the scope of this article, is the effect of Louisiana Civil Code
article 1806 following the recent amendments to Article 2324(B). Article 1806 provides in part that
"[a] loss arising from the insolvency of a solidary obligor must be borne by the other solidary
obligors in proportion to their portion."
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the jury assesses fault as follows: Mutt 50%; Jeff 25%; state 25%;
verdict for $100,000. If pure several liability is applied, Peter can only
collect $50,000 from Mutt and $25,000 from Jeff, leaving him unable
to collect the remaining $25,000.
Pure several liability obviates the need for contribution; no tortfeasor ever
pays more than its proportional share of the plaintiffs recoverable damages.
II. JOINT AND SEVERAL VS. SEVERAL LIABILITY: THE NATIONAL PICTURE
Four states still do not have comparative fault (Alabama, Maryland, North
Carolina, and Virginia), and they retain joint and several liability. Of the forty-
six states that have some form of comparative fault, ten states still have the pure
form of joint and several liability, 9 and twelve states now have pure several
liability.'0 The remaining twenty-four states, including Louisiana, have some
mixture of joint and several and several liability." These statutory schemes can
be quite complex. The common thread, however, is that they all represent a
compromise position between the two extremes-pure joint and several liability
on the one hand and pure several liability on the other. Louisiana is an excellent
example of this compromise, as it attempts to preserve some aspects of both.
III. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY IN LOUISIANA-CIVIL CODE ARTICLE
2324(B)
Touchard v. Williams,3 decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1993,
contains a thorough discussion of the Louisiana law of joint and several liability
9. Arkansas, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Appendix, Part A.
10. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, and Wyoming. See Appendix, Part B.
11. See Appendix, Part C. C
12. For general discussions of the modern doctrine of joint and several liability, see, e.g., Richard
W. Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 45 (1992);
Aaron D. Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response to the Critics, 22
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1125 (1989); Richard W. Wright, Throwing Out the Baby With the Bathwater:
A Reply to Professor Twerski, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1147 (1989); Aaron D. Twerski, The Baby
Swallowed the Bathwater: A Rejoinder to Professor Wright, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1161 (1989);
Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Amnong Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense
of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Erposure, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1141
(1988).
Mississippi in 1989 adopted a statute modifying joint and several liability quite similar to
Louisiana's Article 2324, and therefore an article discussing the Mississippi statute is also instructive.
H. Wesley Williams I1. 1989 Tort "Reforn" in Mississippi: Modification of Joint and Several
Liability anzd the Adoption of Comparative Contribution, 13 Miss. C. L. Rev. 133 (1992).
13. 617 So. 2d 885 (La. 1993).
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prior to 1987.' 4 Essentially, it was the pure form of joint and several liability,
which in Louisiana is called liability "in solido" or solidary liability. As the
court noted, this has been a part of Louisiana's civil-law tradition for over 150
years. However, the statute had been amended in 1979 to provide that if the
plaintiff's fault was greater than that of a particular tortfeasor, that tortfeasor's
liability to the plaintiff was limited to his proportional share. This was the first
modification in the direction of several liability.
In 1987, the Louisiana Legislature amended Civil Code article 2324(B) to
modify the doctrine further.'" One proposal, which was defeated, would have
imposed pure several liability. Instead, the Legislature adopted an intermediate
position. Article 2324(B) now reads, in relevant part (emphasis added to
highlight the key language):
[Except in the case of willful torts,] liability for damages caused by two
or more persons shall be solidary only to the extent necessary for the
person suffering injury, death, or loss to recover fifty percent of his
recoverable damages; however, when the amount of recovery has been
reduced in accordance with [Article 2323, plaintiff's contributory
negligence], a judgment debtor shall not be liable for more than the
degree of his fault to a judgment creditor to whom a greater degree of
fault has been attributed. Under the provisions of this Article, all
parties shall enjoy their respective rights of indemnity and contribution.
Except as described in Paragraph A of this article, or as otherwise
provided by law, and hereinabove, the liability for damages caused by
two or more persons shall be a joint, divisible obligation, and a joint
tortfeasor shall not be solidarily liable with any other person for
damages attributable to the fault of such other person, including the
person suffering injury, death, or loss, regardless of such other person's
insolvency, ability to pay, degree of fault, or immunity by statute or
otherwise.
A. Fifty Percent Of What?
The first question that arises under this section is, how is the 50% limitation
to be calculated? Does it mean that:
14. For additional discussions of the issuies raised in this article, and others, see David W.
Robertson, The Louisiana Law of Comparative Fault: A Decade of Progress, I Louisiana Practice
Series (LSU Law Center 1991); Queenan, supra note 7; Donald C. Massey & A. Kirk Gasperecz,
Employers Beware: The Free Ride May Be Over, 33 Loy. L. Rev. 947 (1988); Chamallas, supra note
2 (in large part out of date, but contains helpful discussions of various issues, and the parts dealing
with contribution are still mostly current).
15. See Queenan, supra note 7.
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1. Once the plaintiff has collected 50% of his damages, from whatever
source(s), the joint and several liability of all defendants is extinguished;
or
2. Plaintiff can collect as much as he can from any of the defendants,
so long as no one defendant is required to pay more than 50% of the
judgment?
The facts of the Touchard case present an excellent illustration. Mary
Touchard was injured in a four-vehicle accident. The vehicles were being
operated by Williams (Touchard was a passenger in the Williams auto), Minter,
Causey, and Lege. At trial, the jury assessed Touchard's damages at $100,000
and found fault as follows: Williams 63%; Causey 30%; and Lege 7%.
(Touchard was not found to be at fault.) After trial, Williams' insurer paid
$25,000; Causey's insurer paid $30,000; and Lege's insurer paid $7,000. Thus,
the situation was then as follows:





Defendants argued, and the trial court and Court of Appeal, Third Circuit,
agreed' 6 that under Article 2324(B) as amended, the defendants collectively
were only solidarily liable to the extent necessary for the plaintiff to recover 50%
of her "recoverable" damages (here, $100,000). Since Touchard had in fact
collected more than 50% of her damages (i.e. $62,000), no defendant was
required to contribute more than his proportional share.'7 Thus, plaintiff could
not seek any additional sums from Causey or Lege. Note that this is exactly the
situation that joint and several liability was intended to cover. Assuming that
Causey or Lege had additional insurance coverage or assets, either or both could
have been required to make up the $38,000 shortfall.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana disagreed with the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal's analysis of Article 2324(B).' 8 The court reviewed the history
of solidary liability in Louisiana, finding that the policy behind the rule had long
and strong support. The court reasoned that if the statute as amended is
ambiguous (as it clearly is) and requires interpretation, any change from the
long-standing solidary liability should be narrowly construed.' 9 In addition, the
16. Touchard v. Williams, 606 So. 2d 927 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), affd in part & rev'd in part,
617 So. 2d 885 (La. 1993).
17. We may infer that, while theoretically plaintiff could have collected an additional $38,000
from Williams, Williams' policy limits were $25,000 and therefore nothing more was available from
Williams' insurer, and Touchard did not seek or was unable to collect from Williams individually.
18. Touchard v. Williams, 617 So. 2d 885 (La. 1993).
19. 617 So. 2d at 892.
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court noted that a construction capping the defendants' collective liability at 50%
could result in delaying the entry of final judgment for an indefinite time, since
the amount for which each defendant is liable would not be known until the
plaintiff had pursued his collection process for (possibly) some period of time-a
result the court characterized as "absurd" and therefore not to be imputed to the
legislature.20 Therefore, the court interpreted the statute to mean that each
defendant's solidary liability is capped at 50% of the plaintiff's recoverable
damages. Thus, the situation is now as follows:
Balance collectible
Defendant % at fault Amount Paid Liability by Touchard
Williams 63% $25,000 $63,000 Up to $38,000
Causey 30% $30,000 $50,000 Up to $20,000
Lege 7% $7,000 $50,000 Up to $38,000
Total paid $62,000




What does this mean in terms of entry of the judgment? Presumably, the
trial court will now enter a two-part judgment for the plaintiff. The judgment
collectively will be for plaintiff's total damages, reduced by plaintiff's percentage
of fault, if any. However, the court must also enter individual judgments against
each defendant for the greater of (1) that defendant's fault percentage, if greater
than 50%, or (2) 50% of the plaintiff's "recoverable" damages-except as to any
defendant whose fault is less than that of the plaintiff. That defendant is
severally liable only. Thus, for example, assume that in the Touchard case the
plaintiff had been 10% at fault, Williams 58%, Causey 25%, and Lege 7%.
Assume that Touchard's "recoverable" damages would have been $90,000, and
in that situation Williams' liability would have been 58% of $90,000 ($52,200),
Causey's liability 50% of $90,000 ($45,000), but Lege's liability would have
been limited to $7,000. Thus, in this situation, if Williams' collectibility was
still only $25,000, plaintiff would come up short, even if the other two
defendants were fully collectible-$25,000 plus $45,000 plus $7,000 equals
$77,000.
The judgment will then somehow provide that the individual judgments
represent the maximum that the plaintiff can collect from each defendant, and the
collective judgment is the maximum total that the plaintiff can collect. Within
20. Id. at 892-93.
21. Johnston v. Fontana, 610 So. 2d 1119 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992); Thompson v. Hodge, 577 So.
2d 1172 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
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those limits, as before, the plaintiff can collect as best he can from one, some,
or all of the defendants in any combination he/she sees fit.
C. "Recoverable Damages"
The foregoing assumes that the statutory phrase "recoverable damages"
means the plaintiffs total damages minus any reduction for the plaintiff's
contributory fault. Two authors are of the opinion that "recoverable damages"
means plaintiff's total damages without reduction. 22 Applying this interpreta-
tion to the hypothetical in the preceding paragraph, the judgment would have
been Williams $58,000, Causey $50,000, and Lege $7,000. Of course, Touchard
could still collect no more than a total of $90,000.
The Louisiana Supreme Court did not have to decide this issue, since the
plaintiff Touchard's fault was zero. The issue is therefore still open. Professor
Robertson justifies this interpretation on the grounds that (a) it is simple
(although the calculation seems equally simple either way) and (b) it effects the
least change from prior law of solidary liability, a rule of interpretation adopted
by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Touchard 3 With all due respect, however,
it seems to this author that "recoverable damages" unambiguously describes the
net damages that the plaintiff is entitled to collect, which would be the net
judgment for the plaintiff.24 This is the traditional starting point for all
allocations of damages among defendants for whatever purpose.25 Moreover,
suppose the plaintiff is 50% at fault and her total damages are $100,000. It
would hardly seem sensible in that situation to say that the solidary liability of
all the defendants is $50,000, which is all that the plaintiff can recover in total.
This seems to be the result reached by the court of appeal in Johnston v.
Fontana:
26
Coleman and Jones, as intentional tortfeasors, are solidarily liable for
plaintiff's damages under 2324 A, subject to reduction for plaintiff's
percentage of fault pursuant to article 2323 (i.e., solidarily liable for
80% of plaintiff's recoverable damages)."
Thus, despite the fact that the court used the term "recoverable damages" in
apparent reference to the plaintiffs total damages, the court holds that the
22. Robertson, supra note 14, discussed in the court of appeal's fouchard decision (606 So. 2d
at 930-31); Queenan, Comment, supra note 7, at 1373-76.
23. Robertson, supra note 14, at 45-46.
24. At least one other author agrees. See Williams, stura note 12, at 159-60.
25. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instrnctions (Civil) B45.01.B, B45.02.B, B45.02.E, B45.03.A, B45.07
(3d ed. 1993), distinguishing "total damages" from "recoverable damages," the latter being plaintiff's
total damages reduced by plaintiff's percentage of fault.
26. 610 So. 2d 1119 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992).
27. Id. at 1123 (emphasis added).
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defendants' solidary liability is limited to the damages reduced by plaintiff's
percentage of fault.
In construing the term "recoverable damages," we should also look to Article
2323 of the Civil Code, which can be deemed to be in pari materia with the
following article, 2324, because it states the comparative negligence rule. Article
2323 provides that the injured person's negligence does not defeat the claim, "but
the amount of damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree
or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury, death
or loss. ' '28 The clear implication of this provision is that the plaintiff's
"recoverable damages" are those after reduction for the victim's contributory
negligence. The term "recoverable damages" in Article 2324 can and should be
read as referring to the term "damages recoverable" in Article 2323.
D. The Effect of Absent Tortfeasors
The next issue is, what happens in those lawsuits in which one or more
tortfeasors (that is, those whose tortious conduct was one of the responsible
causes of the plaintiff's harm) is not a party defendant? There are several
reasons why a tortfeasor might be absent, but the most common ones are (a) the
plaintiff settled prior to trial with one or more tortfeasors, or (b) the tortfeasor
has some immunity, such as that enjoyed by the plaintiff's employer in situations
where the plaintiff's injury was covered by worker's compensation. The
Louisiana Supreme Court in a case decided in 1993, Gauthier v. O'Brien,
29
addressed this issue with respect to the employer-worker's compensation
situation, so that is a good place to start.
E. Employers
The Louisiana Worker's Compensation Law clearly provides that if a worker
has received a compensable injury under circumstances where a third person is
subject to liability in tort, the employee (or his dependents or representative, as
the case may be) is free to pursue a tort claim against that third person or
persons. 30 If successful, the employer (or his insurer) who has paid compensa-
tion is entitled to reimbursement of the worker's compensation and medical
benefits, reduced by the employee's share of the fault (if any).
3'
Example: Robertson, delivering frozen chicken, is injured by the
negligence of an employee of a Popeye's Fried Chicken restaurant
where Robertson was making a delivery." Plaintiffs employer,
28. La. Civ. Code art. 2323 (emphasis added).
29. 618 So. 2d 825 (La. 1993).
30. La. R.S. 23:1101 (Stipp. 1994).
31. La. R.S. 23:1101(B) (Supp. 1994); Gauthier, 618 So. 2d at 832.
32. Based loosely on the facts of Robertson v. Popeye's Famous Fried Chicken, Inc., 524 So. 2d
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Scanio, pays Robertson worker's compensation and medical expenses
totalling, say, $25,000. In a suit against Popeye's, Robertson's damages
are $100,000, but he is found 20% at fault and recovers $80,000.
Scanio can intervene in that lawsuit and recover $20,000 reimbursement
out of Robertson's $80,000. Robertson nets $60,000 from his claim
against Popeye's plus his $25,000 worker's compensation payments. In
this case, we assume that Scanio was not a joint tortfeasor.
Suppose, however, we have a multiple defendant situation in which the,
plaintiff's employer was at fault. For example, in Gauthier, plaintiff was a
passenger in an automobile being driven by her employer, Cooper, and both were
in the course and scope of their employment. Cooper negligently attempted to
pass O'Brien's tractor on the left in a no-passing zone, just as the tractor was
turning left. Although the appeal in Gauthier was taken prior to trial, let us
assume that Gauthier's total damages were $100,000 and that she received
$25,000 in worker's compensation benefits.
If Cooper and O'Brien were each 50% at fault, what is plaintiff's judgment?
The plaintiff in Gauthier argued that the employer's fault should be disregarded.
The court, however, held that this would be contrary to the plain meaning of the
last sentence of Article 2324(B). Therefore, the jury is required to assess the
fault of absent tortfeasors, including the'plaintiff's employer, so that the initial
allocation of fault in this hypothetical would be Cooper 50% and O'Brien 50%.
The supreme court makes it clear that the jury can be required to assess fault
against the non-party employer, just as it has done before. 3
However--does Article 2324(B) mean that O'Brien cannot be required to
pay more than his "virile" share, or $50,000? Is the judgment against O'Brien
limited to $50,000? No, says the supreme court in Gauthier. The allocation of
fault to an employer is necessary to arrive at correct allocations of fault as to all
other parties. But because of the reimbursement scheme of the worker's
compensation law, and the public policy favoring "full tort recovery" for
plaintiffs, the trial court after the jury has returned its verdict "should disregard
the proportion of fault assessed to the employer and reallot the proportionate
fault of all other blameworthy parties." ' Thus, in our example, Cooper's 50%
share would be reallotted to "all other blameworthy parties"-in this case, only
O'Brien-with the result that O'Brien's share becomes 100%.
The foregoing hypothetical is too simple. Let us use a hypothetical variation
on the Touchard facts. Assume that in the Touchard case, Touchard was
Williams' employee and they were in the course and scope of their employment
at the time of the accident, so that Touchard had been paid $25,000 in worker's
compensation benefits. Further assume that for some reason Touchard, the
97 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
33. Gauthier. 618 So. 2d at 827 (citing La. Code Civ. P. art. 1812(C)(2)).
34. Id. at 833 (emphasis added).
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plaintiff, was 10% at fault, Williams 58%, Causey 25%, and Lege 7%. Assume
the same $100,000 damages.
After the jury returns its verdict finding everyone's percentage of fault
(including Williams') and finding plaintiff's total damages to be $100,000, the
jury goes home. The trial court then reallocates Williams' fault among "all other
blameworthy parties"-which, of course, includes the plaintiff. This results in
a judgment as follows:
Reallocation
Tortfeasor % at fault of Williams' % Judgment
Touchard 10% 10/42 or 23.81% $76,190.00 in favor
Williams 58% $19,047.50 in favor"
Causey 25% 25/42 or 59.52% $59,520.00 against
Lege 7% 7/42 or 16.67% $ 7,000.00 against
Total: 100%
F. Other Absent Tortfeasors
The other principal category of absent tortfeasors are those with whom the
plaintiff has settled prior to trial. As to these tortfeasors, the pre-existing
Louisiana rule is that the liability of the non-settling tortfeasors is reduced by the
amount of the percentage of fault assigned by the trier of fact to the settling
tortfeasor(s).3 This rule should remain unchanged by the 1987 amendment to
Article 2324(B). But, of course, unlike the situation with respect to an employer,
there will be no reallocation of fault in this situation. Thus, the rules of joint and
several liability will apply based on the percentages determined by the jury. For
example, assume the original Touchard facts, except that the plaintiff was 10%
at fault, Williams 58%, Causey 25%, and Lege 7%. Assume the same $100,000
damages. Further assume that Touchard settled prior to trial with Williams for
$25,000 (the limits of Williams' policy). Plaintiff's judgment would be for
$90,000, but it would run against Causey for $45,000 and Lege for $7,000.
Thus, the most that p!aintiff could collect, in addition to the $25,000 she already
received from Williams, would be $52,000. However, if the percentages were
35. This is paid to Williams out of Touchard's $76,190. However, note that the most Touchard
can hope to collect from Causey and Lege is $63,520. Does this mean that the employer's
reimbursement should be affected? Probably not; there is simply no statutory authorization for doing
so. Also, note that I have assumed that the reduction in the employer's reimbursement is computed
based on the employee's reallocated fault. This seems to be the result mandated by the language of
La. R.S. 23:1101(B) (Supp. 1994), in addition to being the only fair and reasonable result.
36. La. Civ. Code art. 1803, Joseph v. Ford Motor Co., 509 So. 2d.1, 3 (La. 1987); Antley v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., 539 So. 2d 696, 707 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
Note that this credit is available only to the extent that the tortfeasors would have been liable in
solido. Lavergne v. Latwell Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 11. 562 So. 2d 1013, 1017 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1990).
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plaintiff 10% at fault, Williams 45%, Causey 25%, and Lege 20%, plaintiff
would then be able to collect her full $90,000, because the judgment against
Causey and Lege would be $45,000 each."
What about tortfeasors with whom there has been no settlement but who
have not been joined for some other reason-another immunity, perhaps, or who
are beyond the jurisdiction of the court? The last sentence of Civil Code article
2324(B) seems clear that these tortfeasors will be treated the same as settling
tortfeasors.3"
G. Contribution
The new rules as to joint and several liability do not affect the defendants'
rights to contribution. It is important to remember that the law of joint and
several liability concerns only the rights of the defendants vis-a-vis the plaintiff,
not the rights of the defendants to redistribute the amounts they have paid to the
plaintiff under the law of contribution or indemnity. Once the fault shares of the
defendants have been finally calculated, these shares should determine who is
entitled to contribution based on having paid the plaintiff more than his share.
It should be remembered, of course, that contribution ordinarily cannot be
obtained against an employer,a9 or against a settling defendant.4
IV. CONCLUSION
Louisiana's new modified joint and several liability scheme represents an
approach different from most of the other twenty-four states that have attempted
to find some compromise between the traditional joint and several liability and
its polar extreme, pure several liability. In essence, it makes each defendant
jointly and severally liable but only to the extent of 50% of plaintiff's recover-
able damages, and a defendant whose fault is less than that of the plaintiff is
only severally liable. This is a workable and reasonable accommodation of the
competing interests. Although the statute is not artfully drafted, and leaves many
unanswered questions, this is not uncommon in these types of situations where
the statute is a political compromise resulting from the clash of adverse visions.
It will take some time for the Louisiana Supreme Court to add form and shape
to the statutory skeleton, but this is actually a benefit. Achieving just results will
require experience in individual cases and the arguments of adversaries in the
context of specific fact situations. The Louisiana Supreme Court is off to a good
start.
37. Hayes v. Kelly, 625 So. 2d 628, 633-34 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
38. See Hayes, 625 So. 2d at 633-34.
39. Massey & Gasperecz, supra note 14 (criticizing rule).




NATIONAL STATUS OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY (MARCH, 1994)
A. States With Traditional Joint and Several Liability
Four states-Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia-still
have not adopted comparative fault. These states also retain the traditional
common-law rule of joint and several liability.
Ten states that have adopted comparative negligence statutes have
retained the traditional joint and several (solido) liability. In these states, the
general rule is that the plaintiff's employer is not subject to contribution, but
the employer's fault may be considered in assessing the total fault.
Arkansas (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-64-122, 16-61-203)
Delaware (Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 8132, 6301 et seq.)
Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 156)
Massachusetts (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85, ch. 231B, § 1 et seq.)
Michigan (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 600.2925a, 600.2925b)
Pennsylvania (Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, §§ 7102, 8322 et seq.)
Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 9-20-4-4.1, 10-6-2 et seq.)
South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. § 15-38-10 et seq.)
West Virginia (W. Va. Code § 55-7-13) (except that defendants in a
medical professional liability action less than 25% at fault are only
severally liable, W. Va. Code § 55-7B-9)
Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. § 895.045)
B. States With Pure Several'Liability
Twelve comparative negligence states have adopted pure several liability,
which obviates the need for contribution. In general, in these states if the
plaintiffs employer is one of those at fault, his percentage of fault will be
factored in and the other defendants' share of the fault will be reduced
accordingly. Note that there are sometimes exceptions (e.g., concert of action,
pollution torts) where the defendants will be jointly and severally liable.
Alaska (Alaska Stat. § 09.17.080)
Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2506, 12-2508)
Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5)
Idaho (Idaho Code §§ 6-801 to 6-803)
Indiana (Ind. Code §§ 34-4-33-1 to 33-13)
Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-258a)
Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.182)
North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-02)
Tennessee (McIntyre v. Ballentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992))
Utah (Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 to 78-27-40)
Vermont (Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1036)
Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109)
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C. States With Modified Joint and Several Liability
The remaining twenty-four states have some form
several liability:
of modified joint and
State Modification Statute Status of Employer
California Limits joint and several liabil- Cal. Civ. Code Right of contribution
ity to economic losses in Pl, § 1431.1 et seq. from employer up to
product damage, & wrongful amount of workers'
death cases.- Otherwise sever- comp. benefits paid
al liability.
Connecticut Several liability, except that P Conn. Gen. Employer covered by
who has attempted unsuccess- Stal. § 52-572h workers' comp. not sub-
fully for one year to collect ject to contribution.
from a D may apply to court
to have that D's share reap-
portioned among other Ds.
Florida No J&S except that with re- Fla. Stat. Employer covered by
spect to any party whose % § 768.81 workers' comp. not sub-
of fault equals or exceeds that ject to contribution.
of a particular claimant. J&S
with respect to economic
damages against that party
and in favor of that claimant.
Also J&S in actions where
total damages do not exceed
$25,000.
Georgia J&S, except that if fault is as- Ga. Code Ann. Employer covered by
signed to the plaintiff, trier of § 51-12-33 workers' comp. not sub-
fact "may" apportion award ject to contribution.
among certain defendants;
those defendants are severally
liable.
Hawaii J&S for economic damages; Haw. Rev. Stat. Employer covered by
J&S for noneconomic damag- I § 663-10.9 workers' comp. not sub-
es in actions involving inten- ject to contribution.
tional torts; pollution; toxic
torts; aircraft accidents; strict
and products liability; auto
accidents involving highway
maintenance & design, if
torfeasor had notice of a
prior similar occurrence; and
all other cases if D's share of
fault was 25% or more. Oth-




State Modification Statute Status of Employer
Illinois In negligence & product lia- Ill. Ann. Stat. Right of contribution
bility cases. J&S liability for ch. 735. para. from employer up to
P's past and future medical. 5/2-1117. 1118 amount of workers'
D whose negligence is less (Smith-Hurd comp. benefits paid.
than 25% of the total negl. is 1992)
severally liable with regard to
all other damages, except in
medical malpractice and cer-
tain environmental tort cases.
Iowa Joint and several liability Iowa Code Employer covered by
does not apply to Ds assessed § 668.4 workers' comp. not sub-
less than 50% of the total ject to contribution.
fault of all "parties."
Louisiana Liability is several, except La. Civ. Code Employer's fault is con-
liability is joint and several art. 2324 sidered in apportionment
subject to a cap of 50% of of fault but no right of
P's "recoverable damages" contribution from em-
unless plaintiff is assessed a ployer.
greater degree of fault than
the tortfeasor.
Minnesota Generally J&S. However, Minn. Stat. Right of contribution
except for environmental § 604.02 from employer up to
torts, person whose fault is amount of workers'
15% or less is liable for a % comp. benefits paid.
of the whole award no greater
than 4 times the % of fault.
Also, if state or municipality
is jointly liable & its fault is
less than 35%, it is J&S
liable for an amount no great-
er than twice the amount of
fault.
Mississippi Several, except J&S retained Miss. Code Employer covered by
to the extent necessary for Ann. § 85-5-7 workers' comp. not sub-
injured party to recover 50% ject to contribution.
of his recoverable damages,
Missouri J&S if P is fault-free. If P is Mo. Rev. Stat. Employers are shielded
assessed some fault: J&S § 537.067 from any third party
except if any party moves for suits by defendants.
reallocation of any uncollect-
ible amounts, then the uncol-
lectible amount shall be real-
located among all other par-
ties including P & no amount
shall be reallocated to any
party whose assessed % of
fault is less than P's so as to
increase that party's liability
by more than a factor of 2.
Malpractice cases-any D
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State Modification Statute Status of Employer
against whom an award of
damages is made shall be
jointly liable only with those
Ds whose apportioned % of
fault is equal to or less than
such D.
Montana J&S. except any party whose Mont. Code Employer covered by
negligence is determined to Ann. workers' comp. not sub-
be 50% or less of the com- § 27-1-702 ject to contribution.
bined negligence of all re-
sponsible persons is severally
liable only. The remaining
parties are J&S liable.
Nebraska Ds are jointly and severally Neb. Rev. Stat. Employer covered by
liable for economic damages, §§ 25-21, workers' comp. not sub-
but only severally liable for 185.10 ject to contribution.
noneconomic damages.
Nevada J&S liability only in cases of Nev. Rev. Stat. Employer covered by
1) strict liability. 2) inten- § 41.141 workers' comp. not sub-
tional torts, 3) toxic torts, 4) ject to contribition.
product liability, and 5) con-
certed acts.
New Hampshire J&S, except any party whose N.H. Rev. Stat. Employer covered by
fault is less than 50% is sev- Ann. workers' comp. not sub-
erally liable. Same rule ap- §§ 507:7-e, ject to contribution.
plies to governmental liability 507-B:9
for pollution damage.
New Jersey Any D 60% or more respon- N.J. Rev. Stat. Employer covered by
sible for damages is J&S § 2A: 15-5.2 workers' comp. not sub-
liable for entire amount. D ject to contribution.
more than 20% but less than
60% at fault is J&S for eco-
nomic loss but severally
liable for non-economic loss.
D 20% or less is severally
liable.
New Mexico Several except for intentional N.M. Stat. Ann. Employer covered by
torts, vicarious liability, prod- § 41-3A-1 workers' comp. not sub-
uct liability, and other situa- ject to contribution.
tions "having a sound basis in
public policy."
New York Any tortfeasor found to be N.Y. Civ. Prac. D may recover from em-
50% or less at fault is sever- Law §§ 1601- ployer if employer was
ally liable for noneconomic 1603 also negligent.
loss in personal injury cases Workers' comp. does
(§ 1601), subject to various not provide insulation
exceptions (§ 1602). from suit.
1994] 1633
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Modification Statute Status of Employer
If P is contributorily negli- Ohio Rev. Code Employer covered by
gent, several liability applies Ann. § 2315.19 workers' comp. not sub-
among joint tortfeasors for ject to contribution.
non-economic damages.
Liability is J&S for economic
damages.
If P is negligent, the liability Okla. Stat. tit. Employer is immune
of D is several; if P is not 23, §§ 13, 14; from suit because of
negligent, liability is J&S tit. 51 § 154(F) workers' comp. Howev-
(based on judicial constnlc- er, negligence of em-
tion of §§ 13 and 14)."' ployer must be consid-
State and local governmental ered in determining
liability is several only. comparative fault.
Liability of D found less than
15% at fault for economic
damages shall be several
only. Liability of D more
than 15% at fault is J&S
except that D whose % of
fault is less than P is liable to
P only for that % of recover-
able economic damages.
Liability for non-economic
damages is several only.
Liability for certain toxic torts
is J&S.
A defendant less than 50% at
fault is not jointly and sever-
ally liable for more than








workers' comp. not sub-
ject to contribution.
Employer covered by
workers' comp. not sub-
ject to contribution.
Texas Several for non-economic Tex. Civ. Prac. Employer covered by
loss, except J&S if 1) D's & Rem. Code workers' comp. not sub-
fault is greater than 20%; 2) §§ 33.001, ject to contribution.
D's responsibility is greater 33.012, 33.013
than claimant's (except in
strict liab., prod. liab., or
breach of warranty); 3) no %
of responsibility is attribut-
able to P and D's responsibil-
ity is greater than 10%: 4) P's
injury is from toxic tort.
South Dakota
41. Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1980), reaffirmed in subsequent cases, e.g., Bode
v. Clark Equip. Co., 719 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1986). Liability continues to be joint and several as to
negligence-free plaintiffs. Berry v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co., 634 P.2d 718 (Okla. 1981); Boyles v.
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980).
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State Modification Statute Status of Employer
Washington Several liability, except where Wash. Rev. Employer covered by
P was not at fault, or in spec- Code workers' comp. not sub-
ified types of cases (tortious §§ 4.22.005, ject to contribution.
interference with contract. 4.22.030.
certain product liability cases, 4.22.070
hazardous waste or waste
disposal).

